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RIGGINS' PROTECTS THE INSANITY DEFENDANT
I. INTRODUCTION
Paul Wade was found dead from multiple stab wounds in his Las
Vegas apartment on November 20, 1987.2 David Riggins was arrested
and taken into custody the next day in conjunction with that crime. 3 Rig-
gins suffered from paranoid schizophrenia,4 a disorder characterized by
delusions or hallucinations. 5 While in jail before trial, Riggins told an
examining psychiatrist6 that he was hearing voices and having trouble
sleeping, and that he had previously been treated with the anti-psychotic
drug Mellaril.7 Based on this examination the psychiatrist prescribed for
Riggins doses of Mellaril, which were increased over time, and the anti-
epileptic drug Dilantin.8
Mellaril is not used to cure schizophrenia.9 Rather, it is used to quell
depression and anxiety, which are symptoms of the underlying schizo-
phrenia, so that the patient can be treated with psychotherapy. 10 Thus,
while the psychiatrist prescribed Mellaril to help Riggins overcome the
voices he heard and his insomnia, the drug also altered the chemical bal-
ance in Riggins' brain, thereby changing his cognitive process."
Mellaril, and virtually all anti-psychotic drugs, can cause serious side
effects that endanger the health of the patient.12 However, anti-psychotics
1. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
2. See id. at 129.
3. See Marybeth Zientek, Riggins v. Nevada: Medicated Defendants and Court-
room Demeanor from the Jury's Perspective, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 215, 216 (1992).
4. See id. at 215.
5. See id. at 215 n.2.
6. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 129.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Zientek, supra note 3, at 216 n.7.
10. See id.
11. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
229-30 (1990)).
12. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of
the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 297 (1992); see also infra
pp. 138-143.
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can successfully render an incompetent defendant competent to stand
trial rather than institutionalize the defendant until he regains compe-
tence to proceed to trial.13 Yet, many of the less serious side effects of
anti-psychotic drugs cause physical changes in the patient, such as un-
controllable muscle spasms14 and drowsiness. 15 Such side effects clearly
alter the demeanor of a medicated defendant, and thus raise questions
about whether a jury may prejudicially interpret the defendant's de-
meanor. 16
In Riggins' case, he appeared "zombie-like,"' 17 expressed no re-
morse,18 and appeared "'rational, cool and unemotional' as he testified
about hearing voices of Satan and attacking Mr. Wade with a knife."'19
Studies have shown that the appearance of a medicated defendant
often influences the jury.20 Several of these studies conclude that the "at-
tractiveness" of the defendant plays a central role in the jury's determi-
nation of guilt or innocence.2' Thus, a medicated defendant's emotionless
appearance undermines his insanity defense since the jury is unable to
appraise his unmedicated demeanor.22 Studies also suggest that the se-
verity of the sentence imposed23 is influenced by the jury's perception of
the defendant's demeanor, including considerations of whether the de-
fendant "looked passive, unremorseful, emotionless," or "agitated and
restless. '24 Indeed,
jurors are [often] "fascinated with the defendant and are usually
"unable to take their eyes off him." In addition, "it is a funda-
13. Id.; see also Woodland v. Angus, 830 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 1993); People v.
Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
14. Cichon, supra note 12, at 300.
15. Cichon, supra note 12, at 297.
16. See discussion infra part II.
17. Zientek, supra note 3, at 216 n.10.
18. See id.
19. Id. Brief for the Petitioner at 6-7, Riggins v. Nevada 504 U.S. 127 (No. 90-
8466).
20. Zientek, supra note 3, at 227.
21. See id.
22. See id. at216n.10.
23. Zientek, supra note 3, at 288.
24. Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role
of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. RE.. 201 (1996).
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mental assumption of the adversary system that the trier of fact
observes the accused throughout the trial, either while the ac-
cused is on the stand or sitting at the defense table."25
As a result, the defendant's right to present a defense is impaired by
the state's intervention with forced medication.26 Presumably, a jury may
be less likely to convict a defendant whose physical presence supports
his argument that he lacks the capacity to commit the charged crime.
Consequently, if there is a diminution in culpability, then the insane de-
fendant may be appropriately institutionalized, rather than sentenced to
prison or death.27
Part II of this note highlights the main anti-psychotic drugs used to
forcibly medicate insanity defendants and the common side effects of
these drugs. Many of these anti-psychotics are derivatives of Thorazine,
which was commonly used, but with dangerous side effects, as an anti-
psychotic drug in the 1970s and 1980S.28 And although scientific prog-
ress has been made in an effort to quell the serious side effects of modem
Thorazine derivatives, recent studies demonstrate that many dangerous
demeanor-altering side effects remain prevalent.29 In light of the side
effects caused by anti-psychotic drugs, recent courts have become in-
creasingly sensitive to the reality that forced administration of the drugs
is likely to "prejudice all facets of the defense. 30
Accordingly, Part I analyzes the alleged lack of judicial guidance
in the case of the forcibly medicated defendant, and the resulting criti-
cism of the landmark case Riggins v. Nevada3l in light of one pre-
Riggins32 and two post-Riggins cases. 33 Before Riggins, the circum-
25. Zientek, supra note 3, at 226 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
26. See id.
27. See Zientek, supra note 3, at 228 (stating that jurors are more likely to convict
mentally ill, medicated defendants and sentence them to death).
28. Telephone Interview with Arlene Peterson, Thomas Jefferson University Hos-
pital, Department of Neurosurgery, in Philadelphia, Pa. (February 5, 1999) (explaining
response from Daniel Feinberg, M.D., University of Pennsylvania Hospital, Department
of Neurology, in Philadelphia, Pa. (February 5, 1999)).
29. Cichon, supra note 12, at 291.
30. People v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398,403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
31. 504U.S. 127 (1992).
32. See People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
2000]
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stances under which a state could forcibly medicate an insanity defendant
or pretrial detainee were unclear, leaving the defendant subject to the
caprice of the court.34 Therefore, in Riggins the United States Supreme
Court set the standard for a state's ability to forcibly medicate an insanity
defendant.3 5 However, shortly after the Riggins decision, commentary
suggested that the Riggins holding was ambiguous; and that as a result,
the insanity defendant was left with no more procedural protection than
before the Supreme Court addressed the issue of forced medication.
3 6
Thus, the right to an impartial jury and the right to present a defense are
presently brought into question in the case of the forcibly medicated in-
sanity defendant in light of the Riggins decision, especially since "vali-
dation of the proceedings seems to require the mental as well as the
physical presence of the defendant in the courtroom. 7 Yet, post-Riggins
cases show that despite the alleged lack of guidance in Riggins,38 Riggins
has been interpreted by state courts to require increased sensitivity to the
side effects caused by anti-psychotic medications, the dangers of consti-
tutional violations when the drugs are forcibly administered, and conse-
quently, increased protection for the forcibly medicated defendant.
39
I. THE DRUGS
Medications imposed on defendants can be useful to quell the
symptoms of many mental illnesses.40 However, most, if not all, of these
medications pose serious health risks and can cause serious demeanor-
33. See Woodland v. Angus, 830 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 1993); Posby, 574
N.W.2d 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
34. See generally Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
35. See Riggins, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992).
36. Zientek, supra note 3, at 218.
37. Claudine Walker Ausness, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Sepa-
rating Those Unfit For Adversary Combat From Those Who Are Fit, 66 KY.L.J. 666, 670
(1978) (quoting Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defen-
dants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 834 (1960)); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171 (1974) (stating that the mentally incompetent defendant cannot mount a legal defense
against criminal charges).
38. See Cichon, supra note 12, at 418; see also Zientek, supra note 3, at 218.
39. See generally Woodland, 830 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 1993); Posby, 574
N.W.2d 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
40. Cichon, supra note 12, at 291-92.
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altering side effects when administered incorrectly.41 Moreover, misdi-
agnosis of schizophrenia occurs in as many as forty percent of all cases.
Consequently, drugs are often prescribed erroneously.42 Additionally,
even if diagnosis is accurate, there is currently no way to prescribe the
correct drug or proper dosage with certainty.43 Rather, doctors employ a
"trial and error" method to determine the type and dosage of medica-
tion,44 with incremental increases in dosage "until the patient either re-
sponds or develops toxic symptoms.' 4s Among the most common anti-
psychotic drugs used from the mid-1980s to present are: Mellaril, Pro-
lixin, Serentil, and Perphenazine. 46 These were the drugs forcibly ad-
ministered to the insanity defendants in the cases Riggins,4 7 People v.
Hardesty,48 Woodland v. Angus,49 and People v. Posby,50 discussed be-51 52
low.51 The side effects of these drugs can range from mild to severe.
In his article, The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of
the Right to Refuse Antispsychotic Drugs,53 Professor Dennis Cichon de-
41. See id. at 297-99.
42. See id. at 296.
43. See id. at 296.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting Phillip R.A. May et al., Predicting Individual Responses to Drug
Treatment in Schizophrenia: A Test Dose Model, 162 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE
177, 178 (1976)).
46. See id. at 291. Haldol is another anti-psychotic drug often administered. It
evolved from Prolixin and Mellaril and is still used frequently today. Though Haldol was
not administered in the cases discussed here, its side effects fall within the range of those
discussed in this note. See Erica Goode, With Medication and Determination, a Schizo-
phrenic Slips the Grasp of Psychosis, N.Y. TIES, Jan. 30, 1999 at AS; see also Tele-
phone Interview with Arlene Peterson, Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Depart-
ment of Neurosurgery, in Philadelphia, Pa. (February 5, 1999) (explaining response from
Daniel Feinberg, M.D., University of Pennsylvania Hospital, Department of Neurology,
in Philadelphia, Pa. (February 5, 1999)).
47. 504 U.S. 127.
48. 362 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
49. 830 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 1993).
50. 574 N.W.2d 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
51. See infra pp. 9-22.
52. Before moving into the legal analysis, the following is a brief summary of the
most frequently used anti-psychotic drugs and their potential effects on the demeanor of
an individual. Accordingly, this discussion does not contemplate other non-anti-psychotic
but frequently used drugs, including barbiturates, antidepressants, narcotic analgesics,
psychedelics, or hallucinogens. See Cichon, supra note 12, at 290.
53. Cichon, 53 LA. L. REV. 283
2000]
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lineates two main categories into which the most common side effects of
antipsychotic drugs may be grouped: non-neurological and neurologi-
cal. 4 Non-neurological side effects include disruptions of the autonomic
nervous system, sexual dysfunctions, and blood disorders. Problems
with the autonomic nervous system on the individual include: "dry
mouth and throat, stuffy nose, urinary retention, constipation... paraly-
sis of the intestine.. .hypotension... faintness or dizziness ... [b]lurred
vision ... [impaired] eyesight ... an accumulation of pigment on the
retina ... [and i]n rare cases ... blindness. '56 Sexual dysfunctions in-
clude: "reduced libido and impotence ... inability to ejaculate ... a re-
versal of ejaculation into the bladder ... a sustained and painful erection
occurring without sexual stimulation ... [which] ...often requires
emergency surgery., 57 Other side effects are "increased appetite ...
weight gain ... [f]emales may experience spontaneous lactation," and
menstrual irregularity and infertility; 58 "breast enlargement in males may
occur ... [s]kin disorders," and interference with consistent body tem-
perature.5 9 Blood disorders include "a decrease in white blood cells
which destroy bacteria,... render[ing] the patient highly susceptible to
life-threatening infections. 60 Other general side effects include jaundice,
liver dysfunction, and cardiovascular irregularities.61
Neurological side effects are divided into three categories: extra-
pyramidal side effects, Tardive Dyskinesia, and Neuroleptic Malignant
Syndrome.6 2 The main groups of extrapyramidal effects are parkinson-
ism, akinesia, akathisia, dystonias, Meige's Syndrome, and dyskinesia.
63
The main symptoms of these side effects include: muscular rigidity,
spasms, drooling, slowed motor response, general movement and speech
impairment, apathy, difficulty in reading and talking, depression, irrita-
bility, anxiety, "constant tapping of feet, alteration of posture and shift-
ing of legs," general lack of physical comfort and restlessness (described
54. See id. at 300-10.
55. See id. at 297-99
56. Id. at 297-98.





62. Cichon, supra note 53, at 300.
63. Seeid. at300-10.
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by one patient as an "inner shakiness"), and "suicidal and homicidal be-
havior.'" 64 The symptoms of tardive dyskinesia include: muscle spasms in
the neck, face, jaws, pelvis, mouth, tongue, lips, shoulders and eyelids,
general involuntary and disruptive movement, difficulty swallowing,
talking and breathing (which can be fatal), "pouting, sucking and puck-
ered lip movement.. .bulging cheeks.. .chewing and lateral.. .jaw move-
ments, abnormal postures, expiratory grunts and noises on respiration,"
and brain damage. 65 The symptoms of neuroleptic malignant syndrome
include: "skeletal rigidity," delirium, coma, kidney failure; and deaths
caused by "respiratory failure, cardiovascular collapse and acute kidney
failure."
66
Erica Goode's January 1999 New York Times article discusses newer
anti-psychotic drugs like Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Clozaril, which reduce
risks of tardive dyskinesia and its accompanying side effects of sedation
and "the glazed stare familiar on hospital wards." 67 However, tardive
dyskinesia is only one of many possible debilitating side effects. 68 It is
questionable whether a state, in its forcible medication of a defendant,
would have the resources to stay apprised of the newest and most effec-
tive pharmacological discoveries. It is also questionable whether any
state could constitutionally forcibly administer drugs whose side effects,
due to their novelty, are unknown6 9 and commonly misdiagnosed and
undetected until they become outwardly detectable by physicians, at
which point they often have already caused serious damage or become
incurable in the patient.70
These side effects are common even when the drugs are carefully
administered, and symptoms can occur within hours or can be delayed
and/or latent for months.7 ' Moreover, it is impossible to determine in




67. See Erica Goode, With Medication and Determination, a Schizophrenic Slips
the Grasp of Psychosis, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 1999, at A8.
68. Cichon, supra note 12, at 300-310.
69. See, e.g., Chris Adams, NIH Contract Is Set to Study Antipsychotics, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 14, 1999, at B2.
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forcibly medicated defendant faces his jury without knowing at what
point he might start twitching uncontrollably, sticking out his tongue,
rolling his eyes, dozing-off, and/or grunting, or how the jury will inter-
pret these actions. Oddly, however, some courts have decided that jury
instructions can cure any potential prejudice.73
Ill. BEFORE AND AFTER RiGGINS
The medicated defendant who offers an insanity defense ought to be
permitted to show the jury his "true mental state" rather than one sub-
dued by anti-psychotics. 74 Generally, the government allows forcible
medication when there is a risk that the individual will harm himself or
others, and under a state's parens patriae interest in providing care for
individuals who lack the competence to care for themselves. 75 But in the
criminal context, the standard for forced anti-psychotic medication had
been considerably lowered and in the case of the insanity defendant am-
biguous, 76 before the Supreme Court decided Riggins v. Nevada. In the
1990 United States Supreme Court case, Washington v. Harper,77 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state's forcible medication of a
prison inmate. 78 Harper, a state prisoner since his 1976 robbery convic-
tion for assaulting two hospital nurses, challenged the forced administra-
tion of anti-psychotic drugs to treat his manic depression. 79 The Su-
preme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected Harper's
interest in avoiding forced administration of anti-psychotic drugs.80
However, though Harper did not prevail in his challenge, the Supreme
Court delineated the limited scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections
when applied to a prison inmate.8 1 The court employed a reasonableness
73. See United States v. Charters, 829 F. 2d 479, 494 n.20 (Mich. App.1987) (cit-
ing People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)).
74. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. at 130 (1992).
75. See id. at 134-5.
76. Cichon, supra note 12, at 418-19; see also Zientek, supra note 3, at 218.
77. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). The limited application of the Harper holding to prison
settings called for the Supreme Court to review the differing categorization of forced
medication of a criminal defendant or pretrial detainee, which calls for a "stricter stan-
dard of review" than that of a prison inmate. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
78. See Cichon, supra note 12, at418-420.
79. See id. at 213.
80. See id. at 221-22.
81. Seeid. at236.
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test, in which the state need only show that: (1) the prisoner is dangerous
to himself or others; and (2) the medication is in the inmate's medical
interest. 82 Harper, though slightly removed from the issue of demeanor
of a criminal defendant or pretrial detainee, is often cited when the de-
fendant argues against forcible medication. Harper was reviewed in 1992
when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case, Riggins v. Ne-
vada,83 which for the first time addressed the forcible medication of a
pretrial detainee and articulated the need for a stricter standard of review
than was required in Harper.8
4
In Riggins v. Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court sentenced David
Riggins to death for the brutal stabbing and murder of Paul Wade,85 fol-
lowing Riggins' failed insanity defense.86 Riggins was forcibly medi-
cated to be competent to stand trial.8 7 He subsequently appealed to the
United States Supreme Court to challenge the forced medication.
Riggins was medicated with Mellaril to control paranoid schizophre-
nia.88 Without medication, paranoid schizophrenia can cause afflicted
persons to hallucinate and "appear tense, suspicious, guarded, and re-
served to the point of vagueness or even mutism."8 In Riggins' case, the
Mellaril made him calm and relaxed, though the excessive doses90 he
received caused drowsiness.91 Without the medication, Riggins' insanity
was evident. It was argued that "he appears agitated, emotionally dis-
turbed, and nervous. He is delusional, believing himself to be the son of
Marilyn Monroe and John F. Kennedy. He hallucinates, claiming to hear
82. See Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT AND THE JuDIcIAL
PROCESs at 202 (1994).
83. 504 U.S. 127.
84. Cichon, supra note 12, at 418; see also Zientek, supra note 3, at 215, 216-17.
85. 504 U.S. at 129.
86. Zientek, supra note 3, at 215.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id., at 215 n.2 (citing THE NEW HARVARD GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRY 282 (Armand
M. Nicholi, Jr., M.D. ed., 1988)).
90. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130-31. From the time of his arrest, Riggins' dosages
went from 100 milligrams to 450 milligrams per day, and ultimately up to 800 milligrams
per day, at which high dosage he remained through the entire trial. See id.
91. See id.
20001
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the voices of Satan and of his assistant who order him to hurt or kill oth-
ers. 92
Among other things, Riggins argued that the state's forced admini-
stration of anti-psychotic drugs violated his Sixth Amendment rights,
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued
that the drugs prevented him from assisting in his defense by causing his
attitude, appearance, and demeanor to be prejudicially affected.93
The Court, however, refused to define a specific mode of inquiry.
94
The Court held that Riggin's forced medication would be permitted only
if it was established that the medication was either: (1) "medically ap-
propriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the
sake of the defendant's own safety or the safety of others"; 95 or (2) nec-
essary in the absence of any other less intrusive means to adjudicate the
defendant's innocence or guilt.96 Although the resulting standard seems
akin to strict scrutiny, the Court expressly refused to label the standard.97
In its refusal, however, the Court recognized the importance of the un-
medicated defendant's demeanor, his control over his own testimony,
assistance of counsel in his defense, and comprehension at trial.98 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court reversed Riggins' conviction and remanded
the case for retrial, but the standard the state court was to use remained
unclear, especially since the Court specifically stated that these interests
are not absolute. The Court's attitude was reflected in the Nevada Su-
preme Court's instructions to the district court on remand:
The retrial of this matter shall be conducted without the invol-
untary administration.. .of antipsychotic medications ... unless
the district court shall find. . . that the administration of antipsy-
92. Zientek, supra note 3, at 215 (Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127 (no. 90-8466) and explaining Riggins' argument that there was a clear dis-
crepancy between his medicated and unmedicated appearance, which was likely to affect
the jury's appraisal of his demeanor).
93. Cichon, supra note 12, at 417-18.
94. See id. at418.
95. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
96. See id. at 137.
97. See id. at 136. This standard was established over the dissent's protestation
that a strict scrutiny standard had, in fact, been employed by the court. See Zientek, su-
pra note 3, at 218.
98. See Zientek, supra note 3, at 216-17.
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chotic medication is medically appropriate and essential, consid-
ering less intrusive alternatives, to ensure [Riggins']...safety...or
the safety of others, or that the administration of antipsychoitc
medication is medically appropriate and necessary in order to
maintain Riggins' competence to stand trial, and that Riggins'
competence cannot be maintained through the use of less intru-
sive means.99
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Riggins, one commentator
has suggested that the Court's standard is vague.' In order to medicate
over the defendant's objection, the state need only show that the drugs
are necessary, and are either the least intrusive method to prevent "dan-
ger" or necessary to further a "compelling" interest. 101 However, the
standard lacked force because a strict scrutiny standard was expressly
rejected. 0 2 Another commentator has suggested that the defendant who
offers an insanity defense is in no better position than he was before Rig-
gins, stating, "[the defendant] will continue to be forcibly medicated
while on trial as long as [the state] can articulate a currently undefined
'essential interest."' 10 3 Therefore, post-Riggins, the insanity defendant is
unable to rely on fundamental constitutional certainties like "'liberty in-
terest' and "'essential state interest." ' 1°4
Furthermore, given the severity of Riggins' disorder, it seems highly
unlikely that Riggins could have been made competent to stand trial
through any less intrusive means than medication. 0 5 Indeed, Riggins'
disorder may have been beyond counseling, and there is no indication
that in time, and without medication, he could naturally outgrow para-
noid schizophrenia.'0 6 In his dissent, Judge Springer stated: "Probably
psychoanalysis would be considered less intrusive than Mellaril; but who
99. See Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 705-06 (Nev. 1993).




104. Id. at 219. However, two post-Riggins decisions demonstrate that despite a
lack of Supreme Court guidance, Riggins has been interpreted to grant substantial protec-
tion to the insanity defendant. See discussion infra pp. 16-22; see also People v. Posby,
574 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), Woodland v. Angus, 820 F.Supp. 1497,
1510 (D. Utah 1993).
105. See Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705 at 710 (Springer, J., dissenting).
106. See id.
2000]
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has time for that?" 107 Forced medication may have been the only way for
Riggins to remain competent to stand trial. Thus, Riggins may, in fact,
have been left in no better position than before the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of forcible medication.
The idea of leaving the insanity defendant in the same position he
was in before the Supreme Court decided Riggins is particularly disturb-
ing in light of pre-Riggins state decisions that evidence uncertainty, lack
of psychological inquiry, and reliance upon curative jury instructions.' 8
For example, in the 1984 pre-Riggins Michigan case, People v.
Hardesty,10 9 the appellate court held that the demeanor of the defendant
is probative of sanity only when the defendant's mental state at the trial
is similar to his mental state at the time the alleged crime was commit-
ted.110 The court ordered the forced medication of the defendant with
anti-psychotic drugs and, in doing so, granted the defendant minimal
protection.' 11 The court found that informing the jury that the defendant
was medicated sufficiently protected his right to testify."12 Based on the
inadequacy of that remedy, the likelihood of leaving intact the defen-
dant's rights to a fair trial and to testify is dubious.
In 1981, William Hardesty was found guilty of a murder spree he
committed in October 1978.113 He was ultimately convicted on four
counts of first-degree murder (two of which were Hardesty's parents),
one second-degree murder, and two assaults with intent to commit mur-
der." 4 He was sentenced to five life sentences plus 250 - 500 years im-
prisonment." 5 The trial judge ordered that Hardesty remain in mental
health facilities for treatment for two years before his trial.1 6 During that
time Hardesty received injections of Prolixin, "an antipsychotic medica-
tion and major tranquilizer" used to treat chronic schizophrenics, which
is "about 100 times more potent than Thorazine." 1 7 In September 1980,
107. Id.
108. See, e.g. People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
109. See id.
110. See id. at 797.
111. Seeid.
112. Seeid.
113. See id. at 789
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 789-90.
117. Id. at 794.
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the trial judge found Hardesty competent to stand trial and ordered that
he remain on anti-psychotic drugs at the discretion of his treating doe-
tor.' 18 Three months later, just before trial, the judge denied Hardesty's
motion to discontinue the forced medication over Hardesty's contention
that he had the right to show the jury his true mental condition on the
stand, especially since Hardesty asserted an insanity defense.1 9 The
court seemed particularly concerned that Hardesty might become incom-
petent again if the anti-psychotic medications were discontinued, despite
Hardesty's concern that the Prolixin would make him appear "much less
psychotic than he really had been at the time of the shootings.' 2° On
appeal, Hardesty argued that since he invoked an insanity defense, and
his demeanor on the witness stand was one element of his proof, forcing
him to take medication to maintain his competence undermined his de-
fense and violated, among other things, his Sixth Amendment rights to
present a defense and testify on his own behalf. 121 Ultimately he argued
that his altered mental state rendered the jury unable to assess the extent
of his insanity.
22
The court balanced the state's interest in safety and continuity at trial
against Hardesty's interest in presenting evidence of his demeanor as
probative of insanity,123 noting that the test was to be applied on a case-
by-case basis. 24 The court pointed to Michigan's Mental Health Code,
which permits the forced medication of a defendant in order to maintain
his competence to stand trial.125 Interestingly, the court also recognized
the importance of the defendant's demeanor and the content of his testi-
mony when an insanity defense is invoked. 126 The court then steadfastly
justified its position that the state's medication of Hardesty was constitu-
tional by concluding that the Prolixin used on Hardesty neither rendered
him incompetent nor left him catatonic. 27 Therefore, the court reasoned,
118. See id. at 790.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 794.
121. See id. at 795.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 797.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 795.
126. See id. at 795 (citing United States v. Chandler, 72 F.Supp. 230 (D.C. Mass.
1947); People v. Van Diver, 261 N.W.2d 78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)).
127. See id. at 797.
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the defendant's demeanor at trial was not prejudicially impaired.128 Fur-
thermore, evidence that Hardesty had taken "a considerable quantity of
Valium" when he committed the crimes compromised the court's opin-
ion of the probative value of Hardesty's demeanor at trial.129 The court's
analysis, however, was unsubstantiated and, therefore, unpersuasive.
In balancing the interests of the state against Hardesty's interests, the
court reasoned that Hardesty's demeanor at trial and on the witness stand
proved insanity only if Hardesty's mental state at the trial "approxi-
mate[d]" his mental state at the time of the offense.130 I do not suggest
that Hardesty should have been administered Valium at trial. The court
could have allowed Hardesty to proceed at trial unmedicated and re-
quired the state to prove his sanity while under the influence of Valium
at the time of the murders. This option would have obviated Hardesty's
constitutional challenge and decreased the likelihood of a Sixth Amend-
ment violation. Alternatively, the court could have again allowed Hard-
esty to proceed to trial undrugged, but this time placed the burden on
Hardesty himself to prove that the Valium did not alter his insanity when
he committed the crimes. Either way, Hardesty's unmedicated demeanor
would have been accurately represented, while the effect that Valium had
on his sanity would have been factored into the jury's considerations.
This is especially true since Valium and Prolixin are entirely unrelated to
each other.
13
Prolixin is an anti-psychotic medication reserved for psychotic pa-
tients, while Valium is an anti-anxiety drug, or relaxant. 132 The court's
refusal to take this into consideration was careless. Dr. Daniel Feinberg,
a neurosurgeon at University of Pennsylvania Hospital, in explaining the
effects of the two drugs on the human brain, emphatically stated: "the
two [drugs] are not even comparable., 133 Moreover, Dr. Feinberg ex-
plained, Prolixin had taken the place of the anti-psychotic medication




131. Telephone Interview with Arlene Peterson, Thomas Jefferson University
Hospital, Department of Neurosurgery, in Philadelphia, Pa. (February 5, 1999) (explain-
ing response from Daniel Feinberg, M.D., University of Pennsylvania Hospital, Depart-
ment of Neurology, in Philadelphia, Pa. (February 5, 1999)).
132. See id.
133. Id. (quoting Dr. Feinberg).
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1990s.134 Currently, the anti-psychotic drug of choice, Risperdal, has the
potential to replace Haldol.135
Paradoxically, the court conceded the side effects of Prolixin but did
not comment on the side effects of Valium or its effects on an individ-
ual's mental state. 136 Instead, the court untenably reasoned: "Proofs taken
below also revealed that defendant had ingested a considerable quantity
of Valium at the time the crimes were committed. Under these circum-
stances, the probative value of defendant's demeanor at trial was attenu-
ated.' 137 It seems that while the medical profession has attempted to cre-
ate anti-psychotic drugs with fewer side effects, determinations of the
severity of those side effects as well as new, but presently undetected
side effects, remains uncertain and vague. The Hardesty court acted
without prudence since the court made no inquiry into whether the ef-
fects of Prolixin approximate the mental state caused by Valium. Thus,
even if the Hardesty court was correct in its holding, its reasoning is un-
substantiated, and its reliance upon jury instructions to cure misinterpre-
tation of the demeanor of the medicated defendant seems, at best, tenu-
ous.
Given the Hardesty court's determination to affirm Hardesty's con-
viction,138 it seems that Riggins would have done very little to influence
the decision as long as Michigan could identify a "necessary" or "com-
pelling" reason for the forced medication. 139 The Hardesty court could
have applied the Riggins standard and maintained its holding by deline-
ating a viable state interest: that Hardesty posed a threat to himself or
others, or that the forced medication was necessary in the interest of
Hardesty's health. 140 Without the guidance of Riggins, however, the court
was determined to affirm Hardesty's conviction and arbitrarily stated that
there was "no impropriety in the trial of a drug-normalized accused";
141
that psychopharmaceutically-induced competence is "a common and ef-
134. See id.
135. See Erica Goode, With Medication and Determination, a Schizophrenic Slips
the Grasp of Psychosis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1999, at A4.
136. See generally People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787 (1984).
137. Id. at 797.
138. See generally 362 N.W.2d 787.
139. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
140. See id.
141. See 362 N.W.2d at 793-94.
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fective procedure.' ' 142 This reasoning is superficial, however, since the
court did not address the real, underlying issue of how the anti-psychotic
drugs affect the demeanor of the defendant; or whether there is a cogent
similarity between the effects of Valium and Prolixin that renders it pos-
sible to equate the defendant's mental state at the time he committed the
crime to his mental state at trial.143 The court expressly confined its dis-
cussion to the state's ability to maintain the defendant's competence with
drugs, and the court proposed to analyze forced medication in the context
of demeanor as an element of proof.144 Yet, a remarkably small portion
of the opinion actually made reference to Prolixin and its effects (ap-
proximately eight lines out of four pages). 45 Most of the opinion focused
on distinguishing the facts of the case from cases that considered the ex-
trajudicial handling of the illegality of forced medication. 146 And it seems
that under the Hardesty rationale, anything short of utter immobility or
unconsciousness would have validated the court's decision.
147
Of course, the underlying concern of courts is often maintaining the
defendant's competence to stand trial: that if the forcible medication
were curtailed, the defendant might lapse in and out of competence or
become altogether incompetent, which would postpone proceedings in-
definitely and allow the defendant to circumvent the state's interest in
trying those accused of murder.148 It has been argued that because of this
underlying concern and state interest, Riggins leaves the forcibly medi-
cated insanity defendant in no better position than he was before the Su-
preme Court decided Riggins, since the state can rely on "a currently un-
defined essential interest" and still satisfy the requirements of due proc-
ess. 49 Yet, despite such pessimistic commentary,15 0 Riggins seems to
truncate a capricious court's ability to forcibly medicate criminal defen-
dants by requiring a significantly higher showing of the state's interest in
142. Id.
143. See generallyid.
144. See id. at 797.
145. See, e.g., Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d at 795-797 (citing State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d
239 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971); Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437 (Mass. 1983);
State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296 (N.M. 1976)).
146. See id.
147. See 362 N.W. 2d at 797.
148. See id. at 792.
149. Zientek, supra note 3, at 218.
150. See id.
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making the defendant competent to stand trial,' 5' evidenced by the two
recent cases Woodland v. Angus
52 and People v. Posby.153
In the 1993 Utah case, Woodland v. Angus, the district court fash-
ioned an adequate solution, and, though other states are not obliged to
adhere to the Woodland court's logic, the court's holding is an appropri-
ate guide for other jurisdictions to follow. Eugene Woodland was
charged with second degree murder and found incompetent to stand
trial.154 He was committed to the state mental hospital, where he was di-
agnosed with a bipolar disorder, which left him in a hypomanic state.
155
Doctors also found that Woodland suffered dementia as the result of al-
coholism.1 56 After Woodland refused medication for his disorder, the
court ordered the state hospital to create a policy and set of procedures
that would allow Woodland to be forcibly medicated, apparently intend-
ing to make Woodland competent to stand trial.157 Accordingly, Wood-
land was forcibly medicated with "serentil, an antipsychotic medication
and lithium carbonate, a mood stabilizer."' 58
The court expressly rejected the application of the reduced standard
of Harper from the outset since the present action did not contemplate
Woodland's or others' safety within an institution. 59 Rather, the court
deemed Riggins the appropriate standard160 and analyzed the hampering
effects of forced medication to maintain competence versus Woodland's
ability to defend himself at trial.' 6' The state also took into consideration
its own interest in prosecuting a defendant accused of murder. 62 In doing
so, the Woodland court demonstrated how the decision in Riggins raised
the standard of review in these cases and increased protection of the pre-
trial detainee.' 63 Woodland was therefore a departure from Hardesty-type
151. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 419.
152. 820 F.Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 1993).
153. 574 N.W.2d 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
154. Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp 1497, 1500 (D. Utah 1993).
155. See id.
156. See.id.
157. See id. at 1500-1509.
158. Id. at 1501.
159. See 574 N.W.2d 398(Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
160. See id. at 1510.
161. See id. at 1511-1519.
162. See id. at 1511-1519.
163. See Cichon, supra note 12 at419.
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reasoning and the accompanying unsubstantiated conclusion that a pre-
trial detainee may be forcibly medicated absent catatonia, or some other
minimal standard. 64 The Woodland court recognized that the Supreme
Court in Riggins declined to "develop substantive standards for judging
forced administration of drugs in the trial or pre-trial setting,"' 6 but in-
terpreted that case as demanding increased protection against the forcible
medication of a pre-trial detainee.1 66 However, the Woodland court's in-
terpretation of Riggins167 is akin to strict scrutiny, a standard which the
Supreme Court majority expressly refused to adopt,168 and which Justice
Thomas, in his dissent, accused the majority of having established.
169
The Woodland court recognized both this discrepancy and the Court's
lack of guidance in Riggins, but nonetheless reasoned a preference for
the protection of the defendant's rights at trial, 170 and required the state
of Utah to show a "compelling" reason for forcibly medicating Wood-
land.
171
The Woodland court specifically addressed the dangerous side ef-
fects of anti-psychotic medications.172 Where the Hardesty court unjusti-
fiably relied upon the medication to maintain the defendant's compe-
tence, the Woodland court met the issue of forced medication with skep-
ticism, 7 3 stating:
While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well
documented, it is also true that the drugs can have serious, even
fatal, side effects. One such side effect ... is acute dystonia, a
severe involuntary spasm of the upper body, tongue, throat, or
eyes ... Other side effects include akathesia (motor restlessness,
often characterized by an inability to sit still); neuroleptic malig-
nant syndrome (a relatively rare condition [which] can lead to
164. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787.
165. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
166. See Woodland, 820 F.Supp. at 1510.
167. See id.
168. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136.
169. See id. at 156.
170. Woodland, 820 F.Supp. at 1510.
171. See id.
172. See id. at n. 15 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. 127, 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
173. See id. at 1512.
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death from cardiac dysfunction); and tardive dyskinesia, perhaps
the most discussed side effect of antipsychotic drugs[, which]...
is characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable movements of
various muscles, especially around the face... 174
... .[T]he 'side effects of antipsychotic drugs may alter de-
meanor in a way that will prejudice all facets of the.. .defense." 75
Therefore, the court held that the state's "significant interest in trying
those accused of murder.. .does not outweigh the [criminal defendant's]
liberty interest [to be free from forcible administration of anti-psychotic
drugs]. 176 The court noted that the state's interest was not to try the de-
fendant in any possible circumstances; but rather, to try him in fair and
accurate circumstances. 77 However, the court did not vitiate the state's
ability to prosecute mentally ill individuals who commit serious crimes
like murder.178 Instead, the defendant will remain in the care of the state
hospital until he is determined to be competent to stand trial.1 9 This way,
the court remains consistent with Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
in Riggins, which opines that society bear the cost of institutionalizing
the defendant "'in order to preserve the integrity of the trial process.""
180
Indeed, the Woodland court found the Hardesty holding unpersua-
sive.' 8' But even the Woodland court's discussion of Hardesty seems
counterintuitive. The court distinguished Hardesty, explaining that the
drugs used in that case enhanced the defendant's ability to assist in his
defense, whereas in the present case, the drugs were likely to hinder the
defendant's ability to assist in his own defense. 8 2 However, the Wood-
land court's distinction makes clear the Catch-22 created by permitting
forced medication of criminal defendants as in Hardesty: the anti-
psychotics will prevent the defendant from assisting in his own defense
174. Id at 1512-13 (citing Washington v. Harper, 949 U.S. 210, 229-230 (1990)).
175. Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. 127, 142).
176. Id. at 1513.
177. Woodland, 820 F.Supp. at 1513.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 1513-14.
180. Id. at 1514 n. 20 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. 127, 145 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)).
181. See id. at 1513-14, n. 23.
182. See Woodland, 820 F.Supp. at 1514, n.23.
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and prevent him from taking the witness stand if the drugs create a dimi-
nution in the defendant's cognitive process or if side effects become so
pronounced that they affect the defendant's demeanor; on the other hand,
if the anti-psychotics render the defendant competent so that he may as-
sist in his own defense, and even take the witness stand on his own be-
half, then he runs the risk that the jury will assume that his prior mental
state at the time he committed the crime(s) comports with his present,
sane appearance in court. Nonetheless, the Woodland court prevented
the forcible medication of Woodland by relying mainly on the ambigu-
ous Riggins standard.
183
In 1997, Michigan revisited the forcible medication issue in People
v. Posby,184 a case that clearly demonstrates the effect of Riggins on the
insanity defendant.
Chester Posby was diagnosed with paranoid persecutorial delusional
disorder after he shot and killed his doctor.185 Posby believed that his
doctor was conspiring with another doctor to perform a brain operation
on him that would kill him.8 6 He believed that by killing the doctor he
was helping other patients, protecting them from harm and death."8 After
the murder Posby was forcibly medicated with the anti-psychotic, per-
phenazine, a "major tranquilizer, ' ' 188 which tended to reduce his delu-
sional thinking.189 Posby made a pretrial motion to be removed from the
medication for trial, which the court denied because of the likelihood that
he would lapse into incompetence and thereby avoid trial. 90 Posby then
made a second, more narrow request to be removed from medication on
the Friday before trial in order to testify the following Monday in an un-
medicated state "so that the jury could observe [the] defendant on the
witness stand in his true mental state" at the time of the shooting.191 It
was established that Posby could lapse into his true, unmedicated mental
state within hours.' 92 However, the trial court denied that request as
183. See id.
184. 574 N.W.2d 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
185. See Posby, 574 N.W. at 398-99.
186. See id. at398.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 402.
189. See id. at 399.
190. See generally id.
191. See Posby, 574 N.W. at 400.
192. See id.
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well. 193 The judge expressed concern that Posby would certainly become
incompetent by the following Monday, which would prevent the trial
from moving forward. 194 Moreover, the court stated that there was no
showing that Posby's unmedicated state at trial would approximate his
mental state at the time he committed the murder.195 The jury found him
guilty of first-degree murder but mentally ill. 196 Posby appealed only the
second issue, that he be taken off the medication so that he could testify
in an unmedicated state.197 Relying on Riggins, the appellate court re-
versed, holding that the state's interest in medicating Posby in order to
make him competent to stand trial was not sufficient to outweigh Posby's
right to present a defense.
198
Thus, once again the Riggins holding granted substantial protection
to the insanity defendant. The appellate court did not expressly overrule
Hardesty, but stated that the holding in Hardesty "is highly questionable
in light of Riggins."'99 As a result, there seems to be little reason to as-
sume that Riggins leaves the insanity defendant in no better place than he
was before Riggins. The court confirmed the shortcomings of the Hard-
esty decision, stating that the Hardesty case "does not really recognize
that mental illness, or insanity, is not solely an issue of demeanor, but
also has to do with thought processes"; 200 and that the administration of
perphenazine made Posby "sedated [and] drows[y]," and could give him
"blurr[ed] vision, dry mouth, and difficulty in initiating urinati[on]. 2 °1
Thus, unlike Hardesty, the present court's inquiry was not blinded by the
community's interest in prosecution. Rather, the court appropriately used
Riggns to protect Posby's interests and the integrity of the trial proc-
ess.
202
However, the sole dissenter in Posby, Judge Cavanagh, adhered




196. See id. at 399.
197. See Posby, 574 N.W. at 400.




202. See Woodland v. Angus, 830 F.Supp. 1497, 1512 (D. Utah 1993).
203. See People v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d. at 404.
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not be entirely protected against a pre-Riggins standard. Among other
things, Judge Cavanagh expressed concern that no evidence was offered
to show that Posby's unmedicated demeanor at trial would approximate
his demeanor at the time he committed the murder.204 However, Judge
Cavanagh apparently failed to consider the well-established effects of the
anti-psychotic medication on the defendant's demeanor. He argued that
Posby appeared calm both at trial and at the time of the shooting.
05
However, that reasoning assumes that Posby's mental state and physical
demeanor are the same with or without the anti-psychotic drugs, in which
case it seems that the defendant need not be forcibly drugged in the first
instance.
In light of Woodland and Posby, it appears that despite the Supreme
Court's refusal to adopt a strict scrutiny standard in Riggins, the insanity
defendant is given increased protections.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision to proceed at trial unmedicated should be left to the de-
fendant rather than be imposed by the state out of necessity. Accord-
ingly, in order to ensure that the insanity defendant is not treated prejudi-
cially, post-Riggins case law confirms that the state must balance the in-
terests in favor of "preserv[ing] the integrity of the trial process '20 6 by
preventing a state's capricious circumvention of the defendant's rights to
assist in his own defense and to be presented with an impartial jury.
Thus, despite commentary that alleges ambiguity in the Supreme Court's
holding in Riggins, Riggins does leave the insanity defendant with
greater protections than he would have had without it.
Daniel Abraham
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204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Woodland, 830 F.Supp. at 1512.
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